Michigan Law Review
Volume 90

Issue 6

1992

On Reading the Constitution
Bruce Fein

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bruce Fein, On Reading the Constitution, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1225 (1992).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol90/iss6/5

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
Bruce Fein*

ON READING THE CONSTITUTION. By Laurence H. Tribe and
Michael C. Doif. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp.
144. $18.95.
In On Reading the Constitution, Laurence H. Tribe 1 and Michael
C. Dorf2 endeavor to dissect various contemporary approaches to constitutional interpretation. The book makes a constructive contribution
to understanding and critiquing competing theories of interpretation
but offers no satisfactory substitute that would be less susceptible to
judicial arbitrariness.
Tribe and Dorf, in an attempt to develop a coherent approach to
constitutional interpretation, divagate into such diverse disciplines as
literature and mathematics. 3 The authors ultimately conclude, however, that no unitary formula should confine constitutional interpretation. Thus, they remonstrate against too much reliance on history or
the textually unratified views of the Founding Fathers (pp. 8-13),
against reading provisions either in complete isolation or as part of a
unified philosophical chorus (pp. 21-28), and against eliminating all
value choices in expounding a charter replete with generalities (p. 33).
Instead, Tribe and Dorf contend that constitutional interpretation
should follow common law traditions in which judges announce narrow rulings founded on the reasoning of prior cases that conform to
the central moral value or values in a specific constitutional clause (pp.
65-80). Tribe and Dorf correctly point out that no school of constitutional interpretation - whether based on original intent, history, traditions, or precedent - can avoid leaving a large discretionary
element to the interpreter. In other words, judges will be capable of
smuggling idiosyncratic value choices into their decisions no matter
what interpretive theory they embrace.
But Tribe and Dorf fail adequately to address the danger of judicial overreaching; instead, they champion an open-ended interpretive
• Private practitioner, Great Falls, VA; syndicated columnist. J.D. 1972, Harvard.-Ecl.
1. Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard University.
2. Law Clerk to Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, U.S. Supreme Court.
3. For example, to prove that some value choice is inherent in the interpretive task, Tribe
and Dorf draw on the standards of mathematical proof expounded by Imre Lakatos. Pp. 87-91.
According to Lakatos, one method of discrediting a claim that a triangle has been constructed
with the sum of its angles greater than 180° is by simply asserting that the figure is an imposter.
With the profundity of Nestor, Tribe and Dorf inform the reader: "In the law there is an analogous device called drawing a distinction without a difference." P. 91.
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approach which may exacerbate the problem. In the authors' view,
the interpretation of terms like liberty and property requires basic value
choices, and "[c]onstitutional value choices cannot be made ... without recourse to a system of values that is at least partially external to
the constitutional text,, (p. 66). Thus, in discussing the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses, Tribe and Dorf insist on resorting to
extraconstitutional sources of authority in the interpretive task (p.
116).
But is there no superior alternative to Tribe and Dorf's reliance on
the personal moral convictions or other idiosyncracies of judges? This
review will attempt to develop an approach to constitutional interpretation that focuses on the language and purpose of constitutional provisions instead of the personal values of judges. It will then compare
this alternative approach with the interpretive theory advanced by
Tribe and Dorf.
I

The Constitution was crafted with the overarching goal of checking government tendencies to tyranny or arbitrariness. Trust in the
benevolence, statesmanship, or wisdom of officeholders in any branch
was generally eschewed because persons who display such characteristics are rarae aves. As James Madison warned in Federalist 51:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government that is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must
first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt,
the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.4
Madison exempted neither members of the federal judiciary from his
critique of human nature nor the judiciary itself from his call for auxiliary institutions or customs to restrain arbitrariness. Concededly, the
Founding Fathers voiced their greatest concern for legislative tyranny
because they had repeatedly been first-hand witnesses to that evil. In
1787, no historical examples existed of abusive exertions of power by a
genuinely independent judiciary endowed with the power of judicial
review because the institution was a constitutional innovation.
But that does not gainsay the Founding Fathers' self-evident desire
for an interpretive theory that enables judicial performance of its
checking role, yet acts as an internal restraint on caprice. Furthermore, the history of the Supreme Court suggests that its members are
typified by mediocrity and a propensity for wrongheadedness urgently
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 150 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981).
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in need of a lucid and restraining theory of constitutional interpretation. Illustrative, but far from exhaustive, are Dred Scott v. Sandford, 5
the income tax decisions, 6 the separate but equal doctrine of six decades, 7 the Lochner era of four decades, 8 the Japanese relocation
cases, 9 the criminal justice revolution 10 and the reapportionment
cases 11 of the Warren Court, and the ex cathedra pronouncement of
Roe v. Wade. 12 As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes perspicaciously observed, judges are apt to be naive and simpleminded and desperately
need education in the obvious. 13
That the Founding Fathers did not envision a Don Quixote role
for the federal judiciary is manifest. At the constitutional convention,
for example, delegate Oliver Ellsworth remonstrated against the superfluity of the Ex Post Facto Clause: "[T]here was no lawyer, no civilian
who would not say that ex post facto laws were void of themselves. It
cannot then be necessary to prohibit them." 14 Ellswo_rth's view lost by
a seven-to-three vote; 15 it was understood that the judiciary would not
be empowered to nullify ex post facto laws on general principles of
justice or fairness. The majority that ratified the Bill of Rights also
apparently believed that its protections required amendments to the
Constitution to obtain legitimacy.
The Founding Fathers renounced the idea of a federal judiciary
empowered to protect individual rights through vague principles of
natural rights or fairness. The Ninth Amendment 16 is not to the contrary. It is a warning to the judiciary to desist from sustaining federal
legislative or executive power simply because its assertion would not
violate a provision in the Bill of Rights. For instance, congressional
power to regulate the press is not automatically legitimate whenever
the regulation does not violate the First Amendment. James Madison,
chief architect of the Bill of Rights, subscribed to that modest purpose
5. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
6. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 601 (1895).
7. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex. rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
9. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943).
10. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, Law and the Court, in CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295
(1920).
14. 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 376
(1937).
15. Id.
16. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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of the Ninth Amendment, a conclusion consistent with the virtual absence of contemporary debate over its inclusion in the Bill of Rights. 17
Thomas Jefferson presciently warned against a cavalier treatment
of the constitutional text and urged that amendments were the best
method of constitutional innovation:
I had rather ask an enlargement of power from the nation, where it is
found necessary, than to assume it by a construction which would make
our powers boundless. Our peculiar security is in possession of a written
Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction.... Let
us go then perfecting it, by adding, by way of amendment to the Constitution, those powers which time and trial show are still wanting. 18

The amendment process, moreover, is not a chimera. Twenty-six
amendments have surmounted the supermajority rules for constitutional ratification, and most were ratified promptly. The amendment
process pertains to theories of constitutional interpretation because it
discredits the idea that only Supreme Court decrees can protect individual rights from the majority. The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments, which prohibit voting discrimination
based on race, gender, or youth, were all proposed and ratified
predominantly by persons representing middle-aged or elderly white
males.
An interpretive theory should not be rejected simply because its
application leads to an unfetching result in some or many cases. As
Justice Benjamin Cardozo observed, the Constitution tolerates many
policies that a judge might think immoral or unfair. Judges empowered to adjudicate according to their individual sense of justice might
produce a benevolent despotism, but such a regime would put an end
to the reign of law. 19 Justice Holmes echoed those sentiments in admonishing Judge Learned Hand that the judicial duty is not to invoke
a personal standard of justice but to play the game according to the
rules.20
What are those rules for constitutional interpretation? Instead of
adhering to the idiosyncratic and highly discretionary approach of
Tribe and Dorf, judges should confine themselves to examining the
language and evident purposes of constitutional provisions. That standard minimizes (but does not eliminate) the opportunity for arbitrary
decrees, yet safeguards the vitality of rights and powers the Constitution clearly endorses.
In many instances, the purpose of a provision will be manageably
17. See 1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 754-55 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of Aug. 17, 1789);
12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 204, 459 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979).
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C. Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 10 THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 10-11 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905).
19. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 136 (1921).
20. LEARNED HAND, A Personal Confession, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 306-07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1960).
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clear from the text. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, for
example, forbids a state from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 21 The equal protection
language, designed to prevent arbitrary legal classifications or applications of the law, provides a central check against the tyranny the constitutional Framers so abhorred. 22 Applying the language and
purpose standard, we see that the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson 23 expounding the separate but equal doctrine was clearly wrong and that
the overthrow of Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education 24 was clearly
correct. Legal segregation of the races in public education was arbitrary from its inception. It served no public interest consistent with
the equal protection rights of individuals. A majority's desire to discriminate is not a constitutionally legitimate aim.
It is irrelevant to the language and purpose standard that all or a
majority of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers believed that segregated public schooling was consistent with its equal protection stipulation. The amendment's ratifiers approved its language, not the
concealed or overt understandings of its champions, and omitted any
express exemption for public schools from its equal protection shield.
Legislators and laymen commonly trumpet general principles of justice while remaining utterly indifferent to the inconsistencies between
these principles and prevailing customs or practices. Intellectual honesty or consistency is not a hallmark of human nature, and legislators
are exceptionally prone to verbal hypocrisy because of their preoccupation with popularity and reelection.
John Milton, who elegantly denounced the licensing of the press in
Aeropagitica, 25 became a censor himself under Cromwell's Commonwealth and Protectorate.26 Emulating Milton, several members of
Congress who supported the First Amendment soon thereafter rallied
behind the 1798 Sedition Act. 27 They were apparently indifferent to
their intellectual inconsistency because the Sedition Act targeted their
21. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV,§ 1.
22. Thus, Justice Robert Jackson noted in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949):
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. . . . The framers of the
Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical
guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles
of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.
336 U.S. at 112.
23. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGmCA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (Richard c. Jebb ed., 1918).
26. WILL DURANT & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF Louis XIV 243 (1963).
27. Representatives Abie! Foster, James Schureman, Thomas Sinnickson and George
Thatcher voted in favor of both the Bill of Rights and the 1798 Sedition Act. See 5 ANNALS OF
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political adversaries of the day. Similarly, a majority of Fourteenth
Amendment champions probably desired an equal protection exemption for public schools because racial integration would have been politically unpopular. But why should the Supreme Court pay attention
to these hypocritical desires at war with the unambiguous concept of
equal protection? If the amendment's ratifiers lacked the political
courage or honesty to water down its equal protection language,
courts were certainly not obliged to shore up such cowardice through
tortured interpretations. That would be unfaithful to the Court's overarching mission to check arbitrary rule. 28 Ultimately, the language
and purpose standard of interpretation properly compels intellectual
honesty from lawmakers - an enormously powerful safeguard against
arbitrariness. The standard also constrains the interpretive task of
judges by limiting the role that personal political convictions may play
in adjudication.
II

How would the language and purpose test fare in general operation, and how does it compare to Tribe and Dorf's interpretive theory?
Would it minimize the opportunity for judicial smuggling of idiosyncratic values into the Constitution? Tribe and Dorf insist that judges
must and should make extraconstitutional choices in constitutional interpretation but that they should seek as much guidance from the text
as possible. That standard simply enlists the Constitution in support
of judges' personal aims, heedless of the resulting arbitrariness it sanctions. Tribe and Dorf fail to explain why judicial arbitrariness is any
less menacing than executive or legislative caprice.
The language and purpose test, in contrast, postulates that arbitrariness in government is equally threatening irrespective of its origins, and it attempts an interpretive constitutional standard that
simultaneously curbs judicial caprice and retains sufficient judicial
clout to arrest tyranny in the nonjudicial branches. No Euclidian
proof exists that the language and purpose test could achieve its intended goals, but a systematic application of this standard to some
central constitutional questions suggests that it is superior to the approach of Tribe and Dorf.
2113-14 (1798); HI5TORY OF CoNGRESS 169-70 (Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard
1843).
28. Of course, the actual text of the Constitution contains several prominent examples of
intellectual dishonesty and hypocrisy. It tolerated slavery, mandated legal assistance in capturing fugitive slaves, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, treated slaves as three fifths of whites for
purposes of electoral apportionment, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, and, until 1808, prohibited
limitations on the slave trade, see U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. All of these provisions conflicted
with the general constitutional principles of electoral government and the protection of individuals from tyranny. But constitutional dignity required incorporation of these unseemly political
compromises into the constitutional text; they were not effectuated by tacit or express oral understandings at the constitutional convention or state ratification conventions.
CONGRESS

May 1992]

On Reading the Constitution

1231

For example, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit both
the federal government and the states from depriving persons "of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." 29 Due process is
clearly violated if either a legislative enactment or its enforcement is
arbitrary or tyrannical, unless the constitutional text elsewhere authorizes such oppression. The general phrase due process does not recognize any exemptions from its renunciation of legal arbitrariness.
In Bolling v. Sharpe, 30 the Supreme Court held that due process
prohibited racial segregation in federally operated schools in the District of Columbia. Such racial segregation, the Court reasoned, constituted an arbitrary deprivation of the liberty of black students: it
served neither an educational nor any other legitimate constitutional
objective. The language and purpose standard justifies Bolling. That
many slaveholding framers of the Fifth Amendment did not subjectively intend to proscribe segregated schooling is irrelevant. The language they ratified created no due process exception for public schools.
In contrast, the language and purpose standard would not support
the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade 31 decree. There the Court ruled
that due process permitted meaningful abortion restrictions only during the third trimester of pregnancy, and then only if carrying the fetus to term would be emotionally and physically undisturbing to the
mother. Writing for a seven-to-two majority, Justice Blackmun insisted that a mother's right to terminate a pregnancy is "fundamental," and that any restrictions on that choice could be justified only by
a compelling government interest. 32 ·Blackmun deduced a right of privacy that includes the abortion choice from the Due Process Clause
and the Ninth Amendment.
The Roe opinion illustrates the interpretive arbitrariness that
comes from discarding a language and purpose standard. How did
Justice Blackmon decide the right to an abortion was fundamental?
Nothing in the constitutional text either identifies rights as fundamental or lists directions for their discovery. The Constitution creates no
hierarchy of rights, crowning some with greater dignity than others,
but the Roe opinion establishes a hierarchy by judicial fiat.
How did Justice Blackmun decide that a governmental interest
must be compelling to restrict the abortion choice? The language and
purpose of due process requires government rationality, not government wisdom or enlightenment. In contrast, the compelling state interest standard leaves judges at sea in their search for government
goals that are sufficiently important; not a single syllable in the Constitution informs the navigational quest. Neither statutory codes nor leg29.
30.
31.
32.

U.S. CoNST. amends. V, XIV.
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
410 U.S. at 155.
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islative histories customarily identify which laws are passed or votes
cast in the belief that the government interest to be promoted is
compelling.
Tribe and Dorf applaud the Roe decree (pp. 60-64), but their interpretive justification seems feeble. They argue that virtually all interpretation requires resort to value choices external to the Constitution
(p. 66); seen in this light, Roe can correctly conclude that the liberty to
choose an abortion is fundamental, even though this right is devoid of
any supporting constitutional text. Tribe and Dorf ask: "How should
the Court go about reading the Constitution to determine if an asserted right is fundamental?" (p. 73). They never provide a satisfactory answer. First, they attempt no justification for the fundamental/
nonfundamental bifurcation of constitutional rights. Second, their
analysis centers on the extrapolation of fundamental rights from precedent (pp. 73-80) while eschewing inquiry into the basic correctness
of the precedent in question.
Tribe and Dorf assert that ''judges possess the requisite tools to
make principled distinctions in the selection of a level of generality in
defining fundamental rights" (p. 114). But this confidence in judicial
competence and restraint seems misplaced. Tribe and Dorf 's explanation of how their interpretive standard would operate betrays its susceptibility to judicial manipulation. The authors' attempt to
characterize government interests as compelling vel non epitomizes interpretive arbitrariness and insults the language and purpose of the
Due Process Clause. Ultimately, no textual or extratextual constitutional guides, no generally accepted concepts of unenumerated rights,
and no interpretive rules constrain judicial whimsy.
How should Roe v. Wade be adjudicated under the language and
purpose standard? Abortion restrictions rationally support the legitimate government interest in protecting the unborn, a conclusion fortified by various state laws making third-party destruction of a fetus
murder and recognizing tort and inheritance rights of a fetus after
birth. Nothing in the politics of abortion suggests that abortion restrictions are a pretext for misogyny. Men and women both are
sharply divided on Roe. Both supporters and opponents of abortion
restrictions enjoy legislative clout and financial resources; public debate is not skewed in favor of or against either position. Prior to Roe,
legislative restrictions on abortion were falling rapidly, following the
lead of California's exceptionally liberal 1967 Therapeutic Abortion
Act, signed by then-Governor Ronald Reagan. 33 No claim that meaningful abortion restrictions are inherently arbitrary would be convincing. Thus, the restrictions pass the due process language and purpose
standard of interpretation.
33. The Act is currently codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE §§ 25950-25958 (West
Supp. 1992).
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Review of First Amendment jurisprudence provides another opportunity to compare the language and purpose test with the interpretive approach advanced by Tribe and Dorf. The amendment
prohibits, in part, any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press."34 The amendment's language protects oral and written forms
of communication, and the institutionalized press, but it does not
reach all attempts to convey an idea, such as music, painting, dancing,
or flag burning. On the other hand, the plain purposes of the Free
Speech and Press Clause justify some embellishment on its language.
Justice Louis Brandeis in Whitney v. California 35 and Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes in De Jonge v. Oregon 36 ably articulated those
purposes. They include the discovery and spread of political truths,
the development of mental faculties, the provision of an emotional
safety valve for persons disgruntled with government policies, and the
promotion of government responsiveness to the will of the people.
These purposes justify a free press interpretation that embraces the
broadcast media and cable television. Their role in the discovery and
spread of political truths and in fostering government responsiveness
to popular opinion is indistinguishable from that of the print media.
The purposes also justify an interpretation of the Free Speech and
Press Clause that denounces government suppression of other forms of
expression. Suppression because of ideological hostility conflicts with
the truth-seeking, emotional safety valve, and government-responsiveness purposes of free speech.
Tribe and Dorf correctly point out that the Free Speech and Press
Clause is insufficiently precise to escape all conscientious disputations
in application {p. 37) but proffer no standards that confine or resolve
such disagreements. In analyzing an ordinance proscribing all First
Amendment activity in a city airport, they properly criticize a literalist
interpretation that would uphold the ordinance on the grounds that
free speech elsewhere was tolerated. 37 But courts need not adopt a
fundamental rights theory of the First Amendment - tacitly advanced by Tribe and Dorf- in order to invalidate the ordinance. The
prohibition in question would clearly undercut _the purposes of the
Free Speech and Press Clause by squelching open discourse in a major
public thoroughfare. Furthermore, the belief that all speech in all
parts of an airport must be suppressed in order to insure uncongested
corridors or nonharassment of patrons does not deserve a claim to
rationality.
Flag desecration laws would also probably fail to pass constitutional muster under the language and purpose standard. Such laws
34.
35.
36.
37.

U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
299 U.S. 353 (1937).
Pp. 68-69 (citing Board of Airport Commrs. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987)).
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mean to suppress the idea that the U.S. flag is unworthy of respect and
flies over a dishonorable or unworthy government. That statutory objective blatantly conflicts with the free-speech purposes of advancing
political discourse and offering a safety valve for persons dissatisfied
with government policy.JS
General prohibitions on public nude dancing, however, should survive the language and purpose standard if the prohibitions are evenhandedly enforced. Public displays of nudity fall well outside the First
Amendment's express language; thus, such activities enjoy constitutional protection only against government restrictions animated by
ideological hostility. Public nudity may be a method of ridiculing infatuation with dress and clothing. But a ban on such expressive conduct does not restrict the countless other communicative vehicles for
conveying that ridicule. Further, public nudity is unlikely to persuade
others that a preoccupation with fashions should be abandoned. Thus,
a contention that general bans on public nudity are inspired by ideological hostility seems implausible. 39 Due process and equal protection, however, would require that the prohibitions be evenhandedly
enforced in order to avoid arbitrary and politically motivated targeting
of violators.
The Supreme Court's libel law doctrine, which establishes formidable constitutional protection for defamatory factual error, seems
clearly flawed under the language and purpose interpretive standard.
In the leading case, New York Times v. Sullivan, 40 the Court held that
the First Amendment prohibited the award of damages for a falsehood
defaming a public official absent clear and convincing evidence that
the culprit acted with actual malice - that is, with knowledge of the
factual error or in reckless disregard of the truth. Justice Brennan
insisted that the actual malice rule was essential to the discovery and
spread of political truths because factual error was "inevitable in free
debate."41
But how do factual falsehoods advance the discovery and spread of
political truths? Falsehoods impede the quest for truth. It is possible
that fear of factual error would cause self-censorship of many truths,
and thus the actual malice rule in aggregate advanced a paramount
free-speech purpose. But Brennan offered not a scintilla of empirical
evidence to support such a problematic proposition. Further, in the
decades since Sullivan, no study has indicated that the Court's holding
enhanced the scope and intellectual rigor of public debate in compari38. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
39. The Supreme Court thus correctly decided Barnes v. Glenn Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456
(1991).
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. 376 U.S. at 271.
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son to the pre-Sullivan era.42
The religion clauses of the First Amendment prohibit laws "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."43 The purposes of the clauses are to prohibit government
practices intended to coerce or ban religious practice and to deny intended government favoritism toward one religion over another, including the establishment of an official church. Furthermore, the Free
Exercise Clause tacitly acknowledges a legitimate constitutional interest in government facilitation of private religious choice by reducing
its cost, through tax exemptions for religious property, conscientious
objection laws, or otherwise. In other words, the Free Exercise Clause
accepts that government may favor religion over nonreligion.
The Supreme Court's prevailing Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause doctrines are woefully misconceived; they are preoccupied with
unedifying formulas that deflect attention from the language and evident purposes of the religion clauses. Emblematic is Lemon v. Kurtzman. 44 There the Court announced that to survive an Establishment
Clause challenge, a statute or practice must enjoy a secular purpose,
must neither materially advance nor inhibit religion, and must avoid
excessive government entanglement with religion.45 If Lemon were
celebrated in the observance rather than the breach, then religion
would be virtually banned from public life.
Consistent with the Lemon test, Tribe and Dorf defend the
Supreme Court's invalidation of a "moment of silence" statute in Wallace v. Jajfree. 46 The statute at issue in that case permitted public
school instructors to commence each school day with a brief period of
silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer."47 The statute made no
effort to coerce children into prayer; more generally, the statute favored neither one religion over another nor religion over nonreligion
because atheists could employ the moment of silence to wish the ultimate doom of all religion. Yet Tribe and Dorf applaud the Court's
decision to strike down the statute. This conclusion is consistent with
the Lemon test's fundamental hostility toward religion and religious
expression.
Ultimately, the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence epitomized by Lemon and Wallace - is mistaken in demanding that
government actions necessarily serve a secular purpose. No inherently
42. Indeed, media reporters generally deny that Sullivan changed investigative or reporting
customs. I have personally asked more than a score of reporters whether Sullivan caused any
changes in their reporting behavior. All answered in the negative. I am unaware of any study
that suggests a contrary conclusion.
43. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
44. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45. 403 U.S. at 612-13.
46. 472 U.S 38 (1985). For Tribe and Dorf's discussion, see pp. 45-47.
47. 472 U.S. at 41.
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secular purpose lies behind the provision of legislative chaplains, or
the words "In God We Trust" on currency, or the reference to God in
the pledge of allegiance. These practices are intended to favor religion
over nonreligion. The same was true of the released time program
sustained in Zorach v. Clauson, 48 conscientious objection laws upheld
in Gillette v. United States, 4 9 and property tax exemptions for church
property validated in Walz v. Tax Commission. so The trilogy reached
the correct results because all the challenged practices facilitated private religious choice and avoided religious coercion or favoritism.
Evenhanded availability of government premises for religious symbols
should likewise pass constitutional muster, as should evenhanded participation of religious organizations in government programs animated
by clearly secular goals, such as education, family-planning counseling, or low-income housing. Thus, the Court has erred in generally
prohibiting government funding of the educational missions of sectarian and nonsectarian private schools,s 1 in proscribing a moment-ofsilence law, s2 and in forbidding a creche display on government
property.s3
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit government from
depriving persons of property without due process of law. As amplified earlier, the Due Process Clauses were intended to proscribe arbitrary or oppressive action, often wielded by one economic faction with
political clout against another with lesser political stature. But the
prevailing economic rights jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is unfaithful to the arbitrariness standard.
Tribe and Dorf permit economic rights barely a cameo appearance
in their constitutional discourse (pp. 65-66). They recite the now-familiar critique of the Lochner era,s4 a period from the 1890s to 1937
when the Court regularly invoked "substantive due process" to overturn laws that interfered with the tenets of laissez-faire capitalism.
They do not renounce Lochner-era jurisprudence for making extraconstitutional substantive value choices, however; instead, they conclude
that it simply made the wrong value choices - wrong because laissezfaire capitalism did not "meaningfully enhance the freedom of the vast
majority of Americans in the industrialized age" (p. 66).
That statement betrays the judicial whimsy that the Tribe and
Dorf approach to constitutional interpretation invites. How do judges
determine whether agricultural price supports or countless other gov48.
49.
SO.
51.
52.
53.
54.

343 U.S. 306 (1952).
401 U.S. 437 (1971).
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
So named for the seminal case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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emmental manipulations of the marketplace "meaningfully enhance
the freedom of the vast majority of Americans?" Do they order a national referendum? Moreover, why should majority economic appetites or envy count, since the Takings, Contract, and Due Process
Clauses were drafted, in part, to resist, not to surrender to, the clamor
of the majority for the wealth of the minority?
The Supreme Court, however, has long endorsed views similar to
those of Tribe and Dorf. Characteristic of constitutional jurisprudence in the field of economic rights is Justice Hugo Black's pronouncement in Ferguson v. Skrupa: 55
[W]e emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the
Due Process Clause "to strike down state laws, regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought." Nor are we able or
willing to draw lines by calling a law "prohibitory" or "regulatory."
Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert
Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours. 56

Justice Black must·have fantasized in suggesting that legislators consult Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or any other theorist in fashioning economic statutes. The vast majority have never
read a syllable of their tomes and are utterly indifferent to economic
theory. Legislators are earthbound creatures who respond to the
clamor of special interest groups with money or votes to offer. Their
summum bonum is reelection, not intellectual tidiness. In Ferguson
itself, the statute under· review granted lawyers a monopoly on debt
adjustment. It takes no political genius to surmise correctly which
interest group fueled the legislative munificence for attorneys.
In applying its due process rationality test to economic regulation,
the Supreme Court should stop shutting its eyes to what everyone else
can see: namely, that the purpose of most economic regulatory statutes is to benefit one class of citizens at the expense of another because
of political expediency. That political dynamic completely neglects
the public interest. The monopoly on debt adjustment in Ferguson
should have been tossed out because it aimed to harm nonlawyer adjusters; debtors were not lobbying to curtail their options. But "a bare
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest," as acknowledged in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno. 57 In summary, if the affiatus for
economic regulation is to injure or favor one segment of the community at the expense of another, then the Supreme Court should give it a
flunking constitutional grade under the rationality test of the Due Process Clause.
55. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
56. 372 U.S. at 731-32 (citations omitted).
57. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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CONCLUSION

As the previous examples should demonstrate, the language and
purpose standard is no panacea for misjudging. The purpose component of the standard admittedly leaves a fair amount of intellectual
discretion consistent with honesty. And Tribe and Dorf are no doubt
correct that the personal political views of judges often enter into the
construction of particular constitutional provisions. But the standard
confines constitutional disagreements within reasonable bounds and
better insures that judges expound the Constitution, not their subjective value choices. The best theory of constitutional interpretation is
one that minimizes arbitrariness or oppression by any branch of government, including the judiciary. The language and purpose standard
may not be the best, but it seems preferable to the more elusive and
subjective standard that Tribe and Dorf salute.

